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CASES NOTED
CONTRACTS - CONSIDERATION -PRE-EXISTING DUTY
Plaintiff- mortgagor sued on -an oral promise by the defendant -
mortgagee to refund accrued interest paid by the plaintiff simultaneously
with prepayment of the principal amount of a debt. The debt was evidenced
by a note and secured by a mortgage. The pvc-payment was pursuant to
a right expressly reserved to the mortgagor in the mortgage. Held, the
alleged promise to refund was unenforceable for lack of consideration.
Casa Marina Hotel Co. v. Barnes, 105 So.2d 204 (Fla. App. 1958).
The question of the validity of a subsequent agreement involving
as consideration a pre-existing duty is by no means a recent one. The
earliest allusion to that effect is the remark of Judge Danver in 1455':
"Where one has a quid pro quo, there it shall be adjudged a satisfaction.
As if one be indebted to me in 40 pounds and I take from him 12d. in
satisfaction of the 40 pounds, in this case I shall be barred of the remainder."
Consequently, under this venerable principle, defendant's promise to refund
part of the payment in satisfaction of a prc-existing debt would be enforce-
able. At the beginning of the 17th century2 the doctrine of consideration
did not exist, and the action of indebitatus assumpsit was in its embryonic
stage3. If it then appeared to the judges that a lesser sum could not
possibly be a satisfaction for a greater, that conclusion was based only on
arithmetical reasoning: "A part cannot be the whole, ten cannot be
twenty." 4 The distinction was made that an object, other than money,
could satisfy the debt if such was the agreement between the parties,
because the different object was something new to the promise.5 With
the appearance of contracts as separate legal entities, some courts properly
distinguished between prepayment as a mere satisfaction of a debt and as
consideration for an agreement of settlement.0 True, that artithmetically
ten did not amount to twenty, but legally if ten was given as the considera-
tion of an agreement, that promise was valid and enforceable. A false gloss
by Lord Ellenborough in the beginning of the 19th century7 was perhaps
1. Y.B. 33 Hen. 6 f.48, pl.32 (1455).
2. Pinnel's Case, 5 Eng. Rep. 117 (S.C. 1602).
3. For a complete study on the history of the doctrine of consideration, see Ames,
Two Theories of Consideration, 12 ltARV. L. Rav. 515 (1899).
4. Id. at 521.
5. The distinction was criticized in its own day by saying that "A creditor might
take a horse or a canary or a tomfit, if he chose, and that was accord and satisfaction;
but by a most extraordinary peculiarity of the English Common Law, he could not take
19s.6d. in the pound; that was nudum pactum ..... That was one of the mysteries
of the English Common Law." Couldery v. Bartrum, 19 Ch.D. 394,399 (1890).
6. As Lord Coke expressed it in Bagge v. Slade, 3 Bulst. 162 1 Roll.R. 354,
Jenk. Cent. Cas. 324 pl. 38, Harv. Ms.R.'l'enp. 14 James 1., 2, S.C. (1600): "If a
man be bound to another by a bill in 1000 pounds and lie pays unto him 500 in
discharge of the bill, the which he accepts accordingly, and doth upon this assume and
promise to deliver up unto him the said bill of 1000, this 500 is no satisfaction of the
1000 pounds, but yet this is good and sufficient to make a good promise and upon
good consideration, because he has paid money, and he hath no remedy for this again."
See also Reynolds v. Pinhowe, 1 Roll. Ab. 28, p1.54, Moo.412 S.C. (1595): "It is
valid because speedy payment excuses and prevents labor and expense of suit".
7. Fitch v. Sutton, 5 East 230 (1804).
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the determining fact in the complete deviation from Judge Danver's remark.A
The satisfaction of a debt was lamentably confused with an agreement
purporting to effectuate it. Finally, some additional requirement appeared,
something collateral in the nature of a benefit to the party relinquishing
his further claim, otherwise the agreement was nudum pactum0 . Thereafter
the application of the "pre-existing duty" rule became almost uniform
throughout the common law system', notwithstanding occasional reticence
from scholars.'
The instant case is an exponent of the majority rule in common law
countries and especially in the United States. Specifically it is stated that
"the doing or promising to do what one is legally bound to do is not a
valid consideration to support the new agreement.' 12 As mentioned in
the preceeding paragraph, this conclusion can only be supported by a
major 'premise holding as consideration a benefit accruing to the promisor
or a detriment incurred by the promisee."' The indiscriminate application
of the pre-existing duty rule as a corollary of the doctrine of consideration
(which of course it is not)," has led to innumerable hardships in regard
to mutual assent if manifested in a subsequent modifying agreement. To
alleviate the situation several escape doctrines are being utilized by the
courts. Some courts distinguish (as was done by the mediaeval judge)
8. Y.B.33 lien. 6 f.48,; 1.32 (1455).
9. Fitch v. Sutton, 5 East 230 (1804).
10. Ames, supra note 3, at 523. See a cases cited infra note 12.
11. "he application of the pre-existing duty involves either an error of fact or
of logic. The performance of the duty is a consideration in fact because a bird in hand
is worth much more than a bird in the bush, and that is why the promisor bargains
to get more in order to get it. But if it is granted that the performance is a benefit
in fact to the promisor, and perhaps a detriment in fact to the promisee, then the
statement that nevertheless there is no "legal benefit" or "legal detriment" is an error
of logic because it is merely saying that the performance of a duty is not a legally
operative consideration because it is not a consideration that is legally operative
I CORBIN CONTRACTS 550-630 (1950).
12. The rule was first stated in Pinnel's Case, 5 Eng. Rep. 117 (S.C. 1602). Followed
in Foakes v. Beer, 9 App. Cas. 605 (1884) it was spread throughout the common law
world. A glance through some American jurisdictions will show the prevalence of the pre-
existing duty rle. Ala.: Life & Casualty Ins. Co. of Tenn. v. Powell, 235 Ala. 537, 180
So.559 (1937). Fla.: Blain v. Howard, 144 Fla. 421, 198 So. 80, 81, (1940); Hogan v.
Supreme Camp of American Woodmen, 146 Fla. 413, 1 So.2d 256, 258 (1941). Ky.:
Nuckols v. Nuckols, 293 Ky. 603, 169 S.V.2d 828 (1943); Mass.: Emerson v. Deming.
304 Mass. 405, 23 N.E. 2d 1016 (1939); Knight v. Farren, 313 Mass. 406, 47 N.E.2d
949 (19431; N.J.: Wilentz v. Hlendrickson, 133 N.J. Eq. 447, 33 A.2d 384 (1940);
Levine v. Blumenthal, 117 N.J.L.426, 189 Atl. 54 (1937). N.Y.: Pape v. Rudolph
Bros. Inc., 257 App. Div.1032, 13 N.Y.S.2d 781 (1939); Davison v. Klaess, 280 N.Y.
252, 20 N.E.2d 744 (1939). Ohio: Heidelberg College v. Natl. City Bank of Cleveland,
65 Ohio App. 212, 29 N.E. 2d 572 (1940). Oi the prevalence of the pre-existing
duty problem in the United States see Hvighurst, Consideration, Ethics and Administra-
tion, 42 COLUM. L. REv. 25 (1942). For a recent English study on the same problem,
see Comment, 101 SoL. L.J.292 (1957). For Australia's law see note in 7 Rrs JUDICATA'382,384 J1957).13. 8 WILLISTON CONTRACTS §§ 103 b, 131 (Rev. ed. 1936); RESTATE.M.NT,
CONTRACTS § 76 (1932).
14. Ames, supra note 3 at 521.
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between the old terms and the inclusion of something "new"' 5 ; others
have avoided the strictness of the rule by being liberal on the determination
of the sufficiency of the benefit to the promisor, their rationale being
shaped by public policy.' Finally, on certain conditions, the element of
consideration has been dispensed with by statutes enacted in about a dozen
states.17
The ancient confusion rejecting a pre-existing duty as a basis for
consideration is evident in the present decision. Logically the reasoning
of the court applied to the facts is incongruent. For, if the oral agreement
is held invalid for lack of consideration (no sufficient benefit to the
promisor), on what basis is the defendant allowed to retain the prepayment?
Apparently it is based on the terms of an agreement extending the time of
the original note. rA However, this extension agreement or clause if tested
under the benefit-detriment and pre-existing duty rules, would also be
invalid for lack of consideration. For, the court made it clear that pre-
payment in no way benefited the defendant (when it invalidated the oral
promise to refund accrued interest paid simultaneously with principal). On
the other hand if the benefit, so repeatedly mentioned by the court, was
the payment of Pn excess of interest would it not be in violation of the
terms of the extension agreement expressly prohibiting the imposition of
penalties on prepayment? The court bluntly rejects any distinction and
15. A typical court construction of the term "new" may be found in: Sclswartzreicb
v. Bauman-Basch, Inc., 231 N.Y.196, 131 N.E. 887 (1921): Such elements as time
and place of performance may constitute something new. See also 1 WILusTor;,
CorRAcTs supra note 13 at 521, supporting the rescission view: "[Al rescission shortly
followed by a new agreement in regard to the same subject matter would create the
legal obligations provided in the subsequent agreement."
16. Adamson v. Bosick, 82 Colo. 309, 259 Pac. 513 (1927). See also Frye V.
Hubbell, 74 N.H.358, 68 Atl. 325 (1925).
17. Some states make acceptance by the obligee of actual part performance by
the obligor a sufficient discharge or modification by way of rescission of the original
agreement: GA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-1204 (1935): "Actual payment of smaller sum, not
promise to pay, may discharge larger debt"; ME. Re.v. STAT. § 65, ch. 100 (1944):"No action may be maintained on demand settled in full discharge by payment of any
money or valuable consideration however small"; N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-540 (1943):
"Payment of lesser sum discharges greater when parties so agree"; VA. CoDE § 5765
(1943): ...."Part performance of the obligation if expressly accepted by the creditor in
writing, though without any new consideration extinguishes the obligation". Same language
may be found in CAL. C&v. ConE §§ 1524 (1933); MoNT. REV. CODE § 7459 (1935);
N. D. REV. CoDE § 9-1307 (1935). In N.Y., if the agreement is in writing, signed by the
party to be bound, couisileration is no longer necessary, N.Y. PEas. PROP. LAw §§ 33(2).
For a complete picture of the statutory law of consideration in the United States and its
effects on the pre-existing duty, see Note, 47 COLUx!. L. REV. 431 (1947). For a
comparative law analysis, see Lorenzen, Causa and Consideration in the Law of Contracts,
28 YALE L.J. 621 (1919); see also study by Prof. A. A. Schiller, The Counterpart of
Consideration in Foreign Legal Systems, REP. N.Y. LAw REV. CoS. 183 (1936).
Specifically in relation to the pre-existing duty problem, see Kozolchyk, La Relatividad
de Los Principios Juridicos en cl Ddrecho Comparado, BoLETsN DEL INSTITUTO DE
DEniEcio COMPARADO, Mexico, Diciembre (1958).
18. Subsequent to the original agreement, but prior to the oral promise to refund
by the defendant an extension to the original note was granted to the plaintiff
on the following terms: "[Tlhe first party reser'es the right to prepay all or any part
of the principal or interest at any time without notice and without penalty." Casa
Marina Hotel v. Barnes, 105 So. 2d 204, 205, (Fla. 1958).
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ignores all mitigating doctrines.' 9 Being absolutely convinced of the axiomatic
nature of the benefit - detriment pre-existing duty rules it states that even
under the most favorable statement of facts, the defendant would still be
entitled to judgement as a matter of law.20 This is certainly tile creditor's
panacea: It will be applied to stop the enforcement of the agreement
which on its face is prejudicial to the creditor, yet it should be forgotten
if its application would mean that the creditor is not to retain an otherwise
invalid payment. Whatever the just solution of the instant case ought to
be, the path chosen by the court is not precisely the one best suited to
meet the demands of modern commerce. Businessmen have a peculiar
approach as to what may constitute benefit or detriment. The transactions
usually entered into, by their very nature reject distinctions as unrealistic
as the one utilized by the court. What most of the courts fail to discover
when dealing with pre-existing duties is that far from being in an area
where the law is an inexorable command, they are within the realm of
moral obligations.2 1 Therefore, the element of bargain should prevail over
the ambiguity of benefit. Consideration should not mean more than "any
act or forbearance in exchange for a promise." 2
Bonis KOZOLCHYK
19. Adamson v. Bosiek, 82 Colo. 309, 259 Pac.513 (1927); Frye v. Hubel], 74
N.H. 358, 68 At. 325 (1925).
20. Casa Marina Hotel Co. v. Barnes, 105 So. 2d 204 (Fla. App. 1958).
21. See Comment, 101 SOL. L.J. 292 (1957).
22. See Ames, supra note 3 at 539, which is also the view adopted by the English
Law Revision Committee Recommendations, 6th Rep. (1937).
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